Tenerife airport disaster

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Tenerife airport disaster

KLM Flight 4805

Pan Am Flight 1736

Wreckage of Flight 4805 at

Accident

Date

27 March 1977

Summary

due

and

error in poor

visibility

Site

, Spain

Total fatalities

583

Total injuries

Total survivors

First aircraft

PH-BUF, the

involved

in the collision

Type

Name

Operator

on behalf of

Holland International

Travel Group

IATA flight No.

KL4805

ICAO flight No.

KLM4805

Call sign

KLM 4805

PH-BUF

Flight origin

Netherlands

Destination

, Spain

Occupants

248

Passengers

234

Crew

Fatalities

248

Survivors

Second aircraft

N736PA, the

involved, pictured three weeks before the

collision

Type

Name

Clipper Victor

Operator

on behalf of

IATA flight No.

PA1736

ICAO flight No.

PAA1736

Call sign

CLIPPER 1736

Registration

N736PA

Flight origin

United States

Stopover

, United States

Destination

, Spain

Occupants

396

Passengers

380

Crew

Fatalities

335

Injuries

Survivors

On 27 March 1977, two

passenger jets collided on a runway at Los

Rodeos Airport (now

) on the

island of

, killing 583 people and injuring 61 others in the

The incident occurred at 17:06

(

) in dense fog, when

KLM Flight 4805

initiated its

run,

colliding with the

side of

Pan Am Flight 1736,

which was on the

runway. The impact and the resulting fire killed all 248 people on board the

plane and 335 of the 396 people on board the

plane, with all 61

survivors being in the front section of the aircraft.

The two aircraft had landed at Los Rodeos earlier that Sunday and were among a

number of aircraft diverted to Los Rodeos due to a bomb explosion at their

intended destination of

. Los Rodeos had become congested

with parked planes blocking the only

, forcing departing aircraft to

taxi on the runway. Patches of thick fog were drifting across the airfield, so

visibility was greatly reduced for pilots and the

An investigation by Spanish authorities concluded that the primary cause of

the accident was the KLM captain's decision to take off in the mistaken

belief that

(ATC) had issued takeoff clearance.

Dutch

investigators placed a greater emphasis on a mutual misunderstanding in radio

communications between the KLM crew and ATC,

but ultimately KLM admitted

that its crew was responsible for the accident and the airline agreed to

financially compensate the relatives of all of the victims.

The accident had a lasting influence on the industry, highlighting in

particular the vital importance of using

. Cockpit procedures were also reviewed, contributing to the

establishment of

as a fundamental part of airline

pilots' training.

The captain is no longer considered infallible, and

combined crew input is encouraged during aircraft operations.

Flight history

[

]

Tenerife was an unscheduled stop for both flights. Their destination was

(also known as Las Palmas Airport or Gando Airport), serving

on the nearby island of

KLM Flight 4805

[

]

KLM captain

featured in a 1977

advertisement for the airline

KLM Flight 4805 was a

for

Holland International Travel Group and had

arrived from

Netherlands.

Its cockpit crew consisted

(age

50),

: 38, 41

Klaas Meurs (42), and

Willem

Schreuder (48). At the time of the accident, Veldhuyzen van Zanten was KLM's

chief flight instructor, with 11,700 flight hours, of which 1,545 hours were

on the 747. Meurs had 9,200 flight hours, of which 95 hours were on the 747.

Schreuder had 17,031 flight hours, of which 543 hours were on the 747.

The aircraft was a Boeing 747-206B, registration PH-BUF, named

Rijn (

)

The KLM jet was carrying 14 crew members and 235 passengers, including 52

children. Most of the KLM passengers were Dutch; also on board were four

Germans, two Austrians, and two Americans. After the aircraft landed at

Tenerife, the passengers were transported to the

. One of the

inbound passengers, Robina van Lanschot, who lived on the island with her

boyfriend, chose not to re-board the 747, leaving 234 passengers on

board.

Pan Am Flight 1736

[

]

Pan Am Flight 1736 was also a charter flight, by the Greek shipping company

. It had originated at

, with

an intermediate stop at

The aircraft was a Boeing 747-121, registration N736PA, named

Clipper Victor

Of the 380 passengers (mostly of retirement age but including two children),

14 had boarded in New York, where the crew was also changed. All but five

passengers onboard the aircraft were Americans; the non-American passengers

were all Canadian nationals. They were on their way to board the cruise ship

[

]

for a 14-day trip across the Mediterranean.

The new crew consisted of Captain Victor Grubbs (age 56), First Officer Robert

Bragg (39), Flight Engineer George Warns (46), and 13 flight attendants. At

the time of the accident, Grubbs had 21,043 hours of flight time, of which 564

hours were on the 747. Bragg had 10,800 flight hours, of which 2,796 hours

were on the 747. Warns had 15,210 flight hours, of which 559 hours were on the

747.

Clipper Victor

was a historically notable plane, as it was the first Boeing

747 to operate a

when it flew from

on 21 January 1970.

On 2 August 1970, in its

first year of service, it also became the first 747 to be

: en route

between JFK and

. It was diverted to

Accident

[

]

Diversion of aircraft to Los Rodeos

[

]

Rijn

(foreground) and

Clipper

Victor

(behind) at Los Rodeos on

the day of the accident

Both flights had been routine until they approached the islands. At 13:15, a

planted by the separatist

exploded

in the terminal of Gran Canaria Airport, injuring eight people.

Due to the

threat of a second bomb, the civil aviation authorities closed the airport

temporarily after the initial explosion, and all incoming flights bound for

Gran Canaria were diverted to Los Rodeos, including the two aircraft involved

in the disaster.

The Pan Am crew indicated that they would prefer to circle

in a

until landing clearance was given (they had enough fuel

to safely stay in the air for two more hours), but they were ordered to divert

to Tenerife.

Los Rodeos was a regional airport that could not easily accommodate all of the

traffic diverted from Gran Canaria, which included five large airliners.

The

airport had only one

and one major

running parallel to it, with four

short taxiways connecting the two. While waiting for Gran Canaria airport to reopen,

the diverted planes took up so much space that they had to park on the long

taxiway, making it unavailable for the purpose of

. Instead, departing aircraft needed to taxi along the runway

to position themselves for takeoff, a procedure known as a

or backtrack.

The authorities reopened Gran Canaria airport once the bomb threat had been contained. The Pan Am plane was ready to

depart from Tenerife, but access to the runway was obstructed by the KLM plane and a refueling vehicle; the KLM

captain had decided to fully refuel at Los Rodeos instead of Las Palmas, apparently to save time. The Pan Am aircraft

was unable to maneuver around the refueling KLM in order to reach the runway for takeoff, due to a lack of safe

clearance between the two planes, which was just 3.7 meters (12 ft).

The refueling took about 35 minutes, after

which the passengers were brought back to the aircraft. The search for a missing Dutch family of four, who had not

returned to the waiting KLM plane, delayed the flight even further. Additionally, Robina van Lanschot,

a tour guide,

had chosen not to reboard for the flight to Las Palmas, because she lived on Tenerife and thought it impractical to

fly to Gran Canaria only to return to Tenerife the next day. She was therefore not on the KLM plane when the accident

happened, and was the only survivor of those who flew from Amsterdam to Tenerife on Flight 4805.

Taxiing and takeoff preparations

[

]

The tower instructed the KLM plane to taxi down the entire length of the runway and then make a 180° turn to get into

takeoff position.

: 2, 5

While the KLM was backtaxiing on the runway, the controller asked the flight crew to report

when it was ready to copy the

. Because the flight crew was performing the checklist, copying the

clearance was postponed until the aircraft was in takeoff position.

: 3–4, 6–7

Simplified map of runway, taxiways, and

aircraft. The red star indicates the location of

impact. Not to scale.

Shortly afterward, the Pan Am was instructed to follow the KLM down

the same runway, exit it by taking the third exit on the left and then

use the parallel taxiway. Initially, the crew was unclear as to

whether the controller had told them to take the first or third exit.

The crew asked for clarification and the controller responded

emphatically by replying: "The third one, sir; one, two, three; third,

third one." The crew began the taxi and proceeded to identify the unmarked taxiways using an airport diagram as they

reached them.

: 3, 6

The crew successfully identified the first two taxiways (C1 and C2), but their discussion in the cockpit indicated

that they had not sighted the third taxiway (C3), which they had been instructed to use.

: 56–57, 59–60

There were no

markings or signs to identify the runway exits and they were in conditions of poor visibility. The Pan Am crew

appeared to remain unsure of their position on the runway until the collision, which occurred near the intersection

with the fourth taxiway (C4).

The angle of the third taxiway would have required the plane to perform a 148° turn, which would lead back toward the

still-crowded main

. At the end of C3, the Pan Am would have to make another 148° turn to continue taxiing

toward the start of the runway, similar to a mirrored letter Z. Taxiway C4 would have required two 35° turns. A study

carried out by the

(ALPA) after the accident concluded that making the second 148° turn

at the end of taxiway C3 would have been "a practical impossibility".

: 19, 23

The official report from the Spanish

authorities explained that the controller instructed the Pan Am aircraft to use the third taxiway because this was the

earliest exit that they could take to reach the unobstructed section of the parallel taxiway.

: 46, 49

These

instructions issued by the airport controllers indicated their lack of familiarity with the difficulty of handling

large aircraft such as the 747. In an interview years later, First Officer Bragg said he believed that the airport

controllers saw the plane pass the first taxiway and their instructions to turn on the third taxiway were intended to

mean the third taxiway they saw after the first one, which would have been taxiway C4.

Weather conditions at Los Rodeos

[

]

Los Rodeos airport is at 633 meters (2,077 ft) above

, which gives rise to weather conditions that differ

from those at many other airports. Clouds at 600 m (2,000 ft) above ground level at the nearby coast are at ground

level at Los Rodeos. Drifting clouds of different densities cause wildly varying visibilities, from unhindered at one

moment to below the legal minimum the next. The collision took place in a high-density cloud.

: 8, 12

The Pan Am crew found themselves in poor and rapidly deteriorating visibility almost as soon as they entered the

runway. According to the ALPA report, as the Pan Am aircraft taxied to the runway, the visibility was about 500 m

(1,600 ft). Shortly after they turned onto the runway it decreased to less than 100 m (330 ft).

: 11, 15

Meanwhile, the KLM plane was still in good visibility, but with clouds blowing down the runway toward them. The

aircraft completed its 180-degree turn in relatively clear weather and lined up on Runway 30. The next cloud was 900 m

(3,000 ft) down the runway and moving toward the aircraft at about 12 knots (14 mph; 22 km/h).

: 12, 16

Communication misunderstandings

[

]

Cockpit and ATC tower communications

These communications are taken from the

of both aircraft, as well as from

the Tenerife control tower's tapes.

1705:36–1706:50

1705:36.7

[KLM first officer completes pre-

flight checklist. KLM 4805 is now at

the end of the runway, in position for

departure.]

1705:41.5

KLM FIRST OFFICER

Wait a minute, we

don't have an ATC clearance. [This

statement is apparently a response to

an advancing of the throttles in the

KLM.]

KLM CAPTAIN

No, I know that, go

ahead, ask.

1705:44.6–1705:50.8

KLM FIRST OFFICER (RADIO)

The KLM

four eight zero five is now ready for

take-off and we are waiting for our

ATC clearance.

1705:53.4–1706:08.1

TENERIFE TOWER

KLM eight seven zero

five

[

] you are cleared to the Papa

beacon, climb to and maintain flight

level nine zero, right turn after

take-off, proceed with heading four

zero until intercepting the three two

five radial from Las Palmas

1706:07.4

KLM CAPTAIN

Yes.

1706:09.6–1706:17.8

KLM FIRST OFFICER (RADIO)

Ah roger,

sir, we are cleared to the Papa beacon

flight level nine zero, right turn out

zero four zero until intercepting the

three two five. We are now at take-off

[or "uh..taking off"].

1706:11.1

[KLM brakes released.]

1706:12.3

KLM CAPTAIN

We gaan

... check thrust.

[We're going ... check thrust.]

1706:14.0

[Engine acceleration audible in KLM

cockpit.]

1706:18.2–1706:21.2

TENERIFE TOWER

OK.... Stand by for

take-off, I will call you. [Only the

start of this message could be heard

clearly by the KLM crew due to radio

interference.]

1706:19.3

PAN AM CAPTAIN

No... uh.

1706:20.3

PAN AM FIRST OFFICER (RADIO)

And

we're still taxiing down the runway,

the clipper one seven three six. [This

message is not heard completely

clearly by the KLM crew due to radio

interference.]

1706:25.5

TENERIFE TOWER

Ah, Papa Alpha one

seven three six, report the runway

clear.

1706:29.6

PAN AM FIRST OFFICER (RADIO)

OK,

we'll report when (we are) clear.

1706:31.7

TENERIFE TOWER

Thank you. [This was

the last radio communication involving

the two aircraft. Everything that

follows is intra-cockpit communication

among the respective crews.]

1706:32–1706:40

1706:32.1

PAN AM CAPTAIN

Let's get the hell out

of here.

1706:34.9

PAN AM FIRST OFFICER

Yeah, he's

anxious, isn't he?

1706:36.2

PAN AM FLIGHT ENGINEER

Yeah, after

he held us up for an hour and a half,

that bastard. Now he's in a rush.

1706:32.4

KLM FLIGHT ENGINEER

Is hij er niet

af dan?

[Is he not clear, then?]

1706:34.1

KLM CAPTAIN

Wat zeg je?

[What do you

say?]

1706:34.2

KLM UNKNOWN

Yup.

1706:34.7

KLM FLIGHT ENGINEER

Is hij er niet

af, die Pan American?

[Is he not

clear, that Pan American?]

1706:35.7

KLM CAPTAIN

Jawel.

[Oh yes.

(emphatic)]

1706:40–1706:50

1706:40.5

[Pan Am captain sees the KLM's landing

lights at approx. 700 m.]

1706:40.6

PAN AM CAPTAIN

There he is ... look

at him. Goddamn that son-of-a-bitch is

coming!

1706:45.9

PAN AM FIRST OFFICER

Get off! Get

off! Get off!

1706:43.5

KLM FIRST OFFICER

1706:44.0

[PH-BUF (KLM 4805) starts

1706:47.4

KLM CAPTAIN

Oh shit!

1706:48

PAN AM CAPTAIN

Oh god damn!

1706:49.7

PH-BUF (KLM 4805) records sound of

collision.

1706:50

N736PA (Pan Am 1736) records sound of

collision.

Immediately after lining up, the KLM captain advanced the

throttles and the aircraft started to move forward.

: 48

Meurs

advised him that ATC clearance had not yet been given and

Veldhuyzen van Zanten responded: "No, I know that. Go ahead, ask."

Meurs then radioed the tower that they were "ready for takeoff"

and "waiting for our ATC clearance". ATC radioed the KLM aircraft

(addressing them by the wrong call sign, although the KLM still

interpreted the transmission as theirs), providing instructions

that specified the route that the aircraft was to follow after

takeoff, but did not clear them for takeoff. To add to the

confusion, the controller had used the word "takeoff" in his

clearance, potentially convincing Veldhuyzen van Zanten that a

takeoff clearance had been issued.

Meurs read the flight clearance back to the controller,

completing the readback with the statement "We are now at

takeoff", although it is still not known whether "We are at

takeoff" or "We are taking off" was said.

Veldhuyzen van Zanten

interrupted the first officer's readback with the comment "We're

going."

The controller, who could not see the runway due to the fog and

did not have any

to use at the airport, initially

responded with "OK" (terminology that is nonstandard), which

reinforced the KLM captain's misinterpretation that they had

takeoff clearance.

The controller's response of "OK" to the

first officer's nonstandard statement that they were "now at

takeoff" was likely due to his misinterpretation that they were in

takeoff position and ready to begin the roll when takeoff

clearance was received, but not in the process of taking off. The

controller then immediately added, "Stand by for takeoff; I will

call you",

indicating that he had not intended the instruction

to be interpreted as a takeoff clearance.

A simultaneous radio call from the Pan Am crew caused mutual

on the radio frequency, which was audible in the KLM

cockpit as a three-second-long shrill sound (or

). This

caused the KLM crew to miss the crucial latter portion of the

tower's response. The Pan Am crew's transmission was "We're still

taxiing down the runway, Clipper 1736!" This message was also

blocked by the interference and inaudible to the KLM crew. Either

message, if heard in the KLM cockpit, would have alerted the crew

to the situation and given them time to abort the takeoff

attempt.

Due to the fog, neither crew was able to see the other plane on

the runway ahead of them. In addition, neither of the aircraft

could be seen from the control tower, as the airport was not

equipped with

After the KLM plane had started its takeoff roll, the tower

instructed the Pan Am crew to "report the runway clear." The Pan

Am crew replied, "OK, will report when we're clear." Upon hearing

this, the KLM flight engineer expressed his concern about the Pan

Am not being clear of the runway by asking the pilots in his own

cockpit, saying "Is he not clear, that Pan American?" Veldhuyzen

van Zanten emphatically replied, "Oh, yes", and continued with the

takeoff.

Collision

[

]

According to the

(CVR), the Pan Am captain

said, "There he is!" when he spotted the KLM's landing lights

through the fog just as his plane approached exit C4. When it

became clear that the KLM aircraft was approaching at takeoff

speed, Captain Grubbs exclaimed, "Goddamn, that son-of-a-bitch is

coming!", while first officer Robert Bragg yelled, "Get off! Get

off! Get off!"

: 49, 53

Grubbs applied full power to the

throttles and made a sharp left turn toward the grass in an

attempt to avoid the impending collision.

By the time the KLM pilots saw the Pan Am aircraft, they had

already exceeded their

and were moving too fast to stop.

In desperation, the pilots prematurely

the aircraft nose

upward and attempted to clear the Pan Am by lifting off, causing a

22 m (72 ft)

The KLM 747 was within 100 m (330 ft)

of the Pan Am and moving at approximately 140 knots (260 km/h;

160 mph; 72 m/s) when it left the ground. The KLM 747's nose

landing gear cleared the Pan Am, but its left-side engines, lower

fuselage, and main landing gear struck the upper right side of the

Pan Am's fuselage,

ripping apart the middle of the Pan Am jet

almost directly above the wing. The KLM 747's right-side engines

crashed through the Pan Am's upper deck immediately aft of the

cockpit,

instantly killing all of the passengers seated

there.

The KLM plane remained briefly airborne, but the impact had

sheared off the No. 1 engine (outer left), caused significant

amounts of shredded materials to be ingested by the No. 2 engine

(inner left), and damaged the wings. The plane immediately went

into a stall, rolled sharply, and hit the ground approximately

150 m (500 ft) past the collision, sliding down the runway for a

further 300 m (1,000 ft). Upon impact with the runway, the full

load of fuel, which had caused the earlier delay, ignited

immediately into a fireball that could not be subdued for several

hours. One of the 61 survivors of the Pan Am flight said that

sitting in the nose of the plane probably saved his life: "We all

settled back, and the next thing an explosion took place and the

whole port side, left side of the plane, was just torn wide

open."

Veldhuyzen van Zanten was KLM's chief of flight training and one

of their most senior pilots. About two months before the accident,

he had conducted the Boeing 747 qualification check on the first

officer of Flight 4805.

His photograph was used for publicity

materials such as magazine advertisements, including the inflight

magazine on board PH-BUF.

KLM had suggested initially that

Veldhuyzen van Zanten should help with the investigation, unaware

that he was the captain who had been killed in the accident.

Victims

[

]

Remains of the

Both aircraft were destroyed in the collision. All 248 passengers

and crew aboard the KLM plane died, as did 326 passengers and 9 of

the 16 crew members aboard the Pan Am plane,

primarily due to

the fire and explosions resulting from the fuel spilled and

ignited in the impact. The other 61 passengers and crew aboard the

Pan Am aircraft survived. There were initially 70 survivors, but 9

passengers later died of their injuries.

: 5, 9

Among the

survivors were the captain, first officer, flight engineer, and

four flight attendants. Most of the survivors on the Pan Am plane

walked out onto the intact left wing, the side away from the

collision, through holes in the fuselage structure.

The Pan Am's engines were still running for a few minutes after

the accident despite first officer Bragg's intention to turn them

off. The roof of the cockpit, where the engine switches were

located, had been destroyed in the collision, and all control

lines were severed, leaving no means for the flight crew to

control the aircraft's systems, including engine fire

extinguishers. Survivors waited for rescue, but it did not come

promptly, as the firefighters were initially unaware that there

were two aircraft involved and were concentrating on the KLM

wreck hundreds of meters away in the thick fog and smoke.

Eventually, most of the survivors on the wing dropped to the

ground below.

The Pan Am flight fatalities included 53 passengers from

, mostly retirees on package tours.

Notable fatalities

[

]

, chief flight instructor for KLM

and the captain of the KLM flight.

, a

, film actress and producer and

second wife of film director

, was on the Pan Am

flight.

, the former

was on the Pan Am flight.

Aftermath

[

]

The following day, the Canary Islands Independence Movement,

responsible for the bombing at Gran Canaria that started the chain

of events that led to the disaster, denied responsibility for the

accident.

Los Rodeos Airport was closed to all

traffic for two

days. The first crash investigators to arrive at Tenerife the day

after the crash traveled there by way of a 3-hour boat ride from Las Palmas.

The

first aircraft that was able to land was a

transport, which

landed on the airport's main taxiway at 12:50 on 29 March. The C-130 was arranged by

Lt. Col Dr. James K. Slaton, who arrived before the crash investigators and started

of surviving passengers. Slaton was dispatched from

just outside of

. Slaton, a

flight surgeon attached to the

, worked with local medical staff and remained on scene

until the last survivor was airlifted to awaiting medical facilities. The C-130 transported all surviving and injured

passengers from Tenerife airport to Las Palmas; many of the injured were taken from there to other Air Force bases in

the US for further treatment.

Spanish Army soldiers were tasked with clearing crash wreckage from the runways and taxiways.

By 30 March, a small

plane shuttle service was approved, but large jets still could not land.

Los Rodeos was fully reopened on 3 April,

after wreckage had been removed from the runway and engineers had repaired it.

Investigation

[

]

Wreckage of the

Boeing

747

The accident was investigated by Spain's

(CIAIAC).

About 70 personnel were involved in the

investigation, including representatives from the United States, the Netherlands

and the two airline companies.

Facts showed that there had been

misinterpretations and false assumptions before the accident. Analysis of the CVR

transcript showed that the KLM captain thought that he had been cleared for takeoff, while the Tenerife control tower

believed that the KLM 747 was stationary at the end of the runway, awaiting takeoff clearance.

Probable cause

[

]

The investigation concluded that the fundamental cause of the accident was that Veldhuyzen van Zanten attempted to

take off without clearance. The investigators suggested the reason for this was a desire to leave as soon as possible

in order to comply with KLM's duty-time regulations (which were put in place earlier that year) and before the weather

deteriorated further.

Other major factors contributing to the accident were:

A heavy and sudden fog greatly limited visibility and the control tower and the crews of both planes were unable to

see one another.

Interference from simultaneous radio transmissions made hearing messages difficult.

The following factors were considered contributing but not critical:

The use of ambiguous non-standard phrases by the KLM first officer ("We're at take off") and the Tenerife control

tower ("OK").

The Pan Am aircraft did not leave the runway at the third exit as instructed.

The airport was forced to accommodate a great number of large aircraft rerouted by the terrorist incident,

disrupting the normal use of taxiways.

Dutch response

[

]

Flags at half-staff in KLM's

headquarters in Amstelveen,

following the disaster (1977)

The Dutch authorities were reluctant to accept the Spanish report blaming the KLM

captain for the accident.

The Netherlands Department of Civil Aviation published

a response that, while accepting that the KLM captain had taken off "prematurely",

argued that he alone should not be blamed for the "mutual misunderstanding" that

occurred between the controller and the KLM crew, and that limitations of using

radio as a means of communication should have been given greater consideration.

In particular, the Dutch response pointed out that:

The crowded airport had placed additional pressure on all parties, including the KLM cockpit crew, the Pan Am

cockpit crew, and the controller;

Sounds on the CVR suggested that during the accident the Spanish control tower crew had been listening to a

match on the radio and may have been distracted;

The transmission from the tower in which the controller passed KLM their ATC clearance was ambiguous and could have

been interpreted as also giving take-off clearance. In support of this part of their response, the Dutch

investigators pointed out that Pan Am's messages "No! Eh?" and "We are still taxiing down the runway, the Clipper

1736!" indicated that Grubbs and Bragg had recognized the ambiguity (this message was not audible to the control

tower or KLM crew due to simultaneous cross-communication);

The Pan Am had taxied beyond the third exit. Had the plane turned at the third exit as instructed, the collision

would not have occurred.

Although the Dutch authorities were initially reluctant to blame Veldhuyzen van Zanten and his crew,

the airline

ultimately accepted responsibility for the accident. KLM paid the victims' families compensation ranging between

$58,000 and $600,000 (or $308,000 to $3.2 million today, adjusted for inflation).

The sum of settlements for

property and damages was $110 million (or $584 million today),

an average of $189,000 (or $1,004,000 today) per

victim, due to limitations imposed by European Compensation Conventions in effect at the time.

Speculations

[

]

This was one of the first accident investigations to include a study into the contribution of "human factors".

2, 6

These included:

Veldhuyzen van Zanten, a KLM training captain and instructor for over ten years working on simulators regularly, had

not flown on regular routes for twelve weeks prior to the accident.

The KLM flight crew, including Veldhuyzen van Zanten, were concerned about exceeding their maximum legally

allowable on-duty hours for the day, which Dutch law had recently tightened. This influenced Veldhuyzen van Zanten's

decision to refuel at Tenerife for the flight to Amsterdam after as brief a stop as possible at Las Palmas.

The apparent hesitation of the flight engineer and the first officer to challenge Veldhuyzen van Zanten further. The

official investigation suggested that this might have been due to not only the captain's seniority in rank but also

his being one of the most respected pilots working for the airline.

38, 41

The first officer had intervened

when Veldhuyzen van Zanten first opened the throttles, but had then failed to do so on the second occasion. Even

though the flight engineer had indeed asked the captain whether or not the Pan Am was clear of the runway, he

seemed reassured by the captain's answer. The co-pilots had clearly challenged the captain's decisions, but were

not insistent enough to convince him to abort the attempted takeoff.

The flight engineer was the only member of the KLM's flight crew to react to the control tower's instruction to

"report the runway clear"; this might have been due to his having completed his pre-flight checks, whereas his

colleagues were experiencing an increased workload, just as the visibility worsened.

22, 26

The ALPA study group concluded that the KLM crew did not realize that the transmission "Papa Alpha One Seven Three

Six, report the runway clear" was directed at the Pan Am, because this was the first and only time the Pan Am was

referred to by that name. Previously, the Pan Am had been called "Clipper One Seven Three Six", using its proper

call-sign.

22, 26

The extra fuel taken on by the KLM added several factors:

Takeoff was delayed by an extra 35 minutes, allowing time for the fog to settle in;

More than 45

of additional weight were added to the aircraft,

increasing the takeoff distance and making

it more difficult to clear the Pan Am when taking off;

The increased severity of the fire caused by the additional fuel led ultimately to the deaths of all those on

board.

Legacy

[

]

Funeral service for the victims of

Tenerife airport disaster at Amsterdam

Airport Schiphol (6 April 1977)

As a consequence of the accident, sweeping changes were made to international

airline regulations and to aircraft. Aviation authorities around the world

introduced requirements for

and a greater emphasis on

English as a common

Air traffic instruction must not be acknowledged solely with a colloquial

phrase such as "OK" or even "

" (which simply means the last transmission was received),

but with a readback of

the key parts of the instruction, to show mutual understanding. The word "takeoff" is now spoken only when the actual

takeoff clearance is given, or when canceling that same clearance (i.e., "cleared for takeoff" or "cancel takeoff

clearance"). Until that point, aircrew and controllers should use the word "departure" in its place (e.g., "ready for

departure"). Additionally, an ATC clearance given to an aircraft already lined up on the runway must be prefixed with

the instruction "hold position".

procedures were also changed after the accident. Hierarchical relations among crew members were played down,

and greater emphasis was placed on team decision-making by mutual agreement. Less experienced flight crew members

were encouraged to challenge their captains when they believed something to be incorrect, and captains were instructed

to listen to their crew and evaluate all decisions in light of crew concerns. This course of action was later expanded

into what is known today as

(CRM), which states that all pilots, no matter how experienced

they are, are allowed to contradict each other. CRM training has been mandatory for all airline pilots since

2006.

In 1978, a second airport was opened on the island of Tenerife, the new

(TFS), which now serves

the majority of international tourist flights. Los Rodeos, renamed Tenerife North Airport (TFN), was then used only for

domestic and inter-island flights until 2002, when a new terminal was opened and Tenerife North began to carry

international traffic again.

The Spanish government installed a ground radar system at Tenerife North Airport following the accident.

Memorials

[

]

Tenerife disaster memorials

Memorial on Tenerife

Westgaarde Cemetery

Westminster Memorial Park

A Dutch national memorial and final

resting place for the victims of the KLM

plane is located in

, at

Westgaarde cemetery. There is also a

memorial at the Westminster Memorial

Park and Mortuary in

, US.

In 1977, a cross in

, San

Diego, California was dedicated to 19

area residents who died in the disaster.

In 2007, the 30th anniversary marked the first time that Dutch and American next-of-kin and aid helpers from Tenerife

joined an international commemoration service, held at the Auditorio de Tenerife in Santa Cruz. The

was inaugurated at the Mesa Mota on 27 March 2007. The monument was designed by Dutch

sculptor Rudi van de Wint (1942–2006).

Documentaries

[

]

The disaster has been featured in many TV shows, podcasts and documentaries. These include:

Episode 1 of

, "Blaming the Pilot" (1996).

Episode 12 of

, "Collision on the Runway" (2004).

Episode 625 of PBS's

, "The Deadliest Plane Crash" (2006).

The PBS special

Surviving Disaster: How the Brain Works Under Extreme Duress

(2011), which was based on

's book

The Unthinkable: Who Survives When Disaster Strikes - and Why

An episode of

Episode 133 (S16E03) of the Canadian TV series

(known by different names in different countries), "Disaster

at Tenerife" (2016), as well as the earlier in-depth 90-minute special "Crash of the Century" (2005).

Footage of the wreckage appears in the disaster documentary

(1979),

directed by

Episode 5 of the

series

Under Exposure

(2023) by Neo.

Series 5 episodes 1 and 2 of the

podcast (2025) by Pushkin Industries, hosted by